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Proverbs express significant truths about a 
cultural  narrative. 1  They  communicate 
values,  beliefs and knowledge.  John  Dewey 
wrote: “The consequences of a belief upon 
other beliefs and upon  behavior  may  be so 
important … that  [people] are forced to 
consider  the grounds or  reasons of their 
belief and its logical consequences.” 2  Dewey 
described the “consideration”  as reflective 
thought, or  what  a  century  later  is called 
critical thinking.
Proverbs helped construct  homeland 
security's narrative during its first decade. 
The ideas they  transmitted reduced 
ambiguity  and gave strategic direction  to the 
new national enterprise.
But  proverbs can  inhibit as much  as 
enhance.  Sometimes the "truth" they  embody 
escapes scrutiny, inhibiting  efforts to allow  a 
narrative to evolve. Herbert  A. Simon  wrote: 
“If it  is a  matter  of rationalizing  behavior  that 
has already  taken  place or  justifying action 
that  has already  been  decided upon, proverbs 
are ideal....  [They] are a  great help in 
persuasion, political debate,  and all forms of 
rhetoric.” 3 
Homeland security’s first  decade was 
characterized by  “ready,  fire,  aim.”  A  great 
deal of work  had to be done in  a  short  period 
of time. Much  was accomplished during that 
decade,  and it  cost a  lot  of money.  By  one 
estimate more than  one trillion  dollars was 
spent  on  homeland-related programs during 
the decade.4 No one knows how  much  of that 
money  went  to ineffective activities because 
the homeland security  enterprise spent more 
effort firing than aiming.  
Homeland security’s second decade can 
productively  focus on  “aiming.”  Academics 
and strategists have an opportunity  to 
critically  examine the basic assumptions 
underpinning  the homeland security 
narrative, and identify  evidence that  supports 
or  refutes foundational  ideas used to guide 
strategic  direction. The purpose of this essay 
is to illustrate such an examination.  
Here are one dozen  proverbs that partially 
outline the homeland security narrative:5
1. Intelligence analysts need to connect 
the dots.
2. They  [the “enemy”] hate us for  our 
freedoms.
3. We fight  them  over  there so we don’t 
have to fight them here.
4. R i s k  i s a  f u n c t i o n  o f t h r e a t , 
vulnerability, and consequence.
5. All disasters are local.
6. All hazards means all hazards.
7. To be prepared get  a  kit, make a  plan, 
and be informed.
8. If you see something, say something.
9. People are likely to panic in a disaster.
10. Those who would give up essential 
liberty  to purchase a  little  temporary 
security  deserve neither  liberty  nor 
security.
11. Terrorists only  have to be lucky  once; 
we have to be lucky all the time.
12. Eight-five percent  of US critical 
infrastructure is owned/controlled/
in-the-hands-of/operated by  [the 
verbs change] the private sector.
I think the proverbs are  wrong  or 
misleading in  important  respects.  As a 
consequence,  they  distort  the homeland 
security  narrative and inhibit  the search  for 
more effective ideas to protect  the nation.  My 
overall  claim  is based on  a mix  of anecdote, 
suggestive evidence,  and hunch. I discuss one 
proverb in  depth  (Eight-five percent of US 
critical infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector) and assert  the others can  also 
benefit from critical analysis.  
The 85  percent figure is probably 
America’s best-known  homeland security 
statistic.  The claim  appears in  the 9/11 
Commission hearings,  the 9/11 Commission 
Report,  the 2002  and the 2007  national 
homeland security  strategies,  and stacks of 
related documents.6  It  is parroted by 
Congress, the DHS, think  tanks, academics, 
trade associations, and other  homeland 
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security  residents.7  Its presence is not 
restricted to our  borders.  The number 
appears also in  Canadian and Czech  Republic 
reports about who owns their  critical 
infrastructure. 8
I will  describe my  efforts over  the past 
decade to understand what  the 85  percent 
claim  means and offer  four  reasons why 
uncritically  accepting  the proverb as truth 
harms homeland security.  I close by 
suggesting  why  the other  proverbs may  also 
be misleading.
WHAT DOES THE NUMBER MEAN?
What  could the 85  percent  number  mean, 
even  in  principle? Is there a  difference that 
matters between “ownership,”  “control,”  “in-
the-hands-of,” or “operated?”  
I can come to terms with  the inability  to 
know  with  certainty  what homeland security 
is.  But what  explains the difficulty  agreeing 
who or what controls critical infrastructure?  
Maybe the quandary  rests in  how  the 
claim  is structured.  Sometimes the number 
refers simply  to all “infrastructure.” 9 Other 
times it’s about “critical” infrastructure. 10
But  putative distinctions may  no longer 
matter.  The initial difference between  critical 
infrastructure and plain  vanilla  infrastructure 
seems to have quietly vanished.  
Critical infrastructure used to mean what 
the USA PATRIOT Act directed it to mean:
Systems and assets, whether physical  or 
virtual, so vital  to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems  and assets would have a 
debilitating  impact on  security, national 
economic security, national  public health 
or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.11  [My emphasis.]
In  2009,  a  different  definition of critical 
infrastructure appeared in  the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan: 
Systems and assets, whether physical  or 
virtual, so vital  that the incapacity or 
destruction  of such  may  have a  debilitating 
impact on  the security, economy, public 
health  or  safety, environment, or  any 
combination of  these matters, across any 
Federal, State, regional, territorial, 
or local  jurisdiction.12  (My  emphasis 
again.)
The “flea  markets, petting zoos, popcorn 
factories,  hot  dog stands or  other  such 
facilities”  DHS was (unreasonably) criticized 
for  including in a  critical assets database a 
few  years ago may  turn out to be someone’s 
critical infrastructure after all. 13
Compounding  the semantic problem,  how 
could one even estimate, let alone calculate 
with  any  precision, ownership  or  control?14 
Does one identify  every  individual  provider  of 
goods and services that  could be included in 
the (18, 19, or more)  sectors,15 discover  who 
owns (in  some legal sense) each business, and 
then  determine percentages? Does one 
classify  companies and organizations into the 
sectors first, then  figure out who owns the 
sectors and calculate from  that  premise? Is 
ownership equivalent to control? Does 
ownership or  control imply  government has 
little to no say in security practices?  
A  July  2011  Congressional Research 
Service Report observed, 
Sharing information  with the federal 
g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
assessments, risk assessments, and the 
taking  of additional protective actions is 
meant to be voluntary. However, the degree 
to which  some of the activities are 
mandated varies across sectors. In  some 
cases, sectors are quite regulated.16
The answer  to whether  the distinction 
between  public  or  private control has 
substantive meaning  is “yes, no, and it 
depends.”
But  what  about the 85  percent  proverb? 
How does it harm homeland security?
WHEN PEDANTRY MATTERS
The word “pedantry”  was invented to refer  to 
an  excessive concern with  petty  details. 17 One 
might  say  anguishing  over  85  percent  is 
pedantry.
One author  who writes about  critical 
infrastructure noted,
Whether  this figure is 100 percent accurate 
or  based on  any  in-depth analysis is 
debatable but, regardless, little or no 
infrastructure would function  (critical  or 
otherwise) without the efforts of private 
sector owners and operators.18
A  senior  DHS official  addressed my 
distress more directly  a few  years ago: “It 
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doesn’t matter  whether the 85  percent  is right 
or  not,”  he said. “We’re still  going to do the 
same thing.”
I believe it  does matter.  And by  “it”  I mean 
the persistence of an  idea  that impedes 
considering alternative ideas about how  to 
protect critical infrastructure.
Here are four  reasons why  the proverb’s 
persistence damages homeland security. A 
discussion of each reason follows. 
1. It gives the impression  we know  more 
than  we do when  it comes to critical 
infrastructure. 
2. It creates a  false image about  the 
power  relationships between  the 
public and private sectors. 
3. It distorts normative understanding 
about roles and responsibilities.
4. It constrains discussions about  policy 
options.
THE IMPRESSION OF COMPETENCE 
The philosopher  Harry  Frankfurt writes 
about  the distinction  between  those who tell 
the truth  or  who lie,  and those who bullshit. 
Truth tellers and liars cohere around the 
truth,  either  to communicate it  or  to hide it. 
One who uses bullshit  does not  care about the 
truth or  falsity  of a  claim, but  instead cares 
about  the impression  the claim  makes. 
Bullshit substitutes sincerity for accuracy. 19  
“Maybe we don’t know  the truth about 
critical  infrastructure,”  the reasonable 
homeland security  professional might  argue, 
“but  the claim  is well-meaning; work with  me 
here so we can do good.”
The sincerity  underpinning  the 85  percent 
myth  gives an  impression  that  when  it  comes 
to critical  infrastructure we fundamentally 
know  what  we are talking about.  More 
specifically, quantifying  ownership and 
control  signals someone knows what 
infrastructure is actually  critical, and 
professionals can thus manage what  is vital  to 
the nation’s security and well-being.  
The number’s misguided precision  veils 
what  we do know: there is no “one definite 
prioritized list  of critical assets…”  and “it 
would not  be possible or  useful to develop 
one.” 20 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC POWER
The 85  percent  number  conveys an  inference 
about  the power  relationships between the 
public and private sector: since the important 
parts of the nation  are  owned by  the private 
sector, government ought to “ask”  the private 
sector  to help out  with  this messy  security 
business.  The private  sector  can,  of course, 
decline.  
There is another  – less discussed – side to 
the power  assessment. The 85  percent 
benediction  does not automatically  advantage 
the private sector. Some infrastructure 
officials,  nominally  in  the private sector, say 
the 85  percent figure justifies preventing the 
private sector  from  receiving  information, 
grants and other public  funds needed to 
upgrade and secure their facilities.
The dilemma… has been  in encountering an 
obdurate, logic-proof insistence by  cops, 
fire fighters, emergency  managers, fusion 
center  staff, and DHS minions to define my 
employer and all  critical infrastructure 
stewards as private sector  entities… [and 
thus] unworthy of [receiving] sensitive 
information… and inherently  suspect of 
being profit driven….21
I have not found data  describing how  well 
the private sector  embraces its sometimes-
reluctant  partnership in  the homeland 
security  enterprise. 22 I have heard anecdotes 
about  industries that  take seriously  the part 
they  play  in  ensuring the nation’s security.23  I 
also hear  stories about  the predictable cast  of 
characters showing  up at regularly  scheduled 
gatherings arranged to praise  or  encourage 
public-private infrastructure partnerships. 
I have not seen the comprehensive metrics 
across critical sectors a  chief financial officer 
or  board of directors would demand about 
the impact  of those partnerships.   But  the 
same can  be said for  evidence about  the 
public sector’s contribution  to preparedness 
and resilience.24  Maybe when  it  comes to 
infrastructure neither sector  has as much 
power as the other believes.  
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OWNERSHIP IS NOT RELEVANT
It may  be rhetorically  convenient to separate 
public and private sector responsibilities.   But 
assuming  what  has yet  to be demonstrated 
interferes with  determining who has to do 
what to strengthen protection.
One of my  colleagues views the “who owns 
what” argument this way:25
The argument is  bogus: the big stuff, like 
water, power, energy, transportation  is so 
regulated and controlled by the feds, that 
the fact that it  is owned by  someone isn't a 
factor.  If  the feds  decided to harden power 
plants, for example, Congress can do what 
it wants.  Isn't  this  the case already  with 
nukes and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
C o m m i s s i o n ? S a m e t h i n g w i t h 
transportation, energy, etc.
Another  colleague expressed his concern 
about responsibilities:26  
The basic foundation  of our society  – [the] 
infrastructure that is  essential  for public 
safety and well-being – is owned and 
controlled by  state and local government.27 
…. The underlying premise behind having 
much of  this  [infrastructure] under state 
and local  control  is they  are monopolies or 
they are so critical  that from a societal 
aspect you cannot have a  company  that 
runs any  of this infrastructure go [into] 
Chapter 7.
Critical infrastructure is too critical  to be 
left  to the private sector  to protect, he argued. 
Policymakers need to acknowledge the 
partnership between  the invisible hand of 
free enterprise and another hand: 
There is a  second “hidden” [and] “unseen 
hand”  to much of this infrastructure. This is 
the state regulatory agencies. The 
regulatory  construct is  what holds this all 
together and without which  the sectors 
could not function. Food and agriculture, 
water  systems, health systems cannot 
function without the regulatory  agencies 
(mostly state government) functioning.
Trying to determine who owns what is less 
productive than  identifying  contributions 
different sectors make to disparate types of 
security and resiliency:
[Our] state governments should actually be 
our primary  infrastructure partner and 
primary  partner in [societal] security and 
resiliency. The private sector who employs 
most  of the work force and generates a 
huge percentage of GDP  should be our 
primary  partner in economic security and 
economic resiliency. Both  are our partners 
in  disaster  resiliency. Most of  our [critical 
infrastructure] does not produce GNP it 
enables GNP  but does not produce 
anything. Thus from an economic 
standpoint we should focus attention on the 
GNP producers. This is  why separation 
between  enablers and producers is 
counterproductive….  We have also made a 
s t rateg ic mis take in [put t ing] a l l 
infrastructure into the “private sector” 
domain  regarding business models. State 
and local  government business models and 
the business model  of a company on  the 
stock exchange are completely different.
HIDING THE NETWORKS
Thinking  about  ownership and control 
encourages strategists and policymakers to 
consider  critical infrastructure primarily  as a 
collection of “eaches”  – individual  farms, 
water  treatment  plants, monuments, dams, 
power plants,  manufacturers – to be 
protected. But “most critical infrastructure 
spans multiple states.”  Gas and oil pipelines, 
electric  power  grids, telecommunications 
networks,  Internet and computer  networks, 
water  supplies,  food, chemical and industrial 
networks “all cross state boundaries.”28 
The “eaches”  framework  that flows from 
the 85  percent mantra obscures policy 
options premised on  a  network view  of 
infrastructure.  Considering  infrastructure as 
networks draws attention to nodes,  links, 
interdependencies,  scale free structures, 
power  laws,  small  worlds,  self-organized 
criticality,  sand piles,  and related concepts 
that  might inspire innovative approaches to 
protecting infrastructure.29
WHAT ELSE?
Debate about  the 85  percent  number  is 
operationally  trivial.  But questioning  whether 
it  is valid can  remind those of us in  the 
homeland security  enterprise to critically 
examine what we accept  as true.  If we got  the 
85  percent wrong,  yet  it  persists as truth, 
what else have we missed?  
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Revisiting the proverbs introduced at  the 
start  of the essay  suggests possible answers to 
that question.
1. Intelligence analysts may  be expected to 
connect the dots,  but the expectation 
ignores the complexity  of the intelligence 
task.  “[Pleading] for  more dots is to 
mistake the nature of the problem  posed 
by  … terrorism, and … even  recognizing 
the significance of the information  is a 
task that  exceeds the capacity  of a  single 
organization….” 30
2. One may  believe the enemy  hates us for 
our  freedoms,  but  one must  also listen  to 
the argument that  “blaming our  freedoms 
for  Muslim  terror is absurd and 
dangerous.” 31
3. We fight  them  over  there so we don’t  have 
to fight them  here,  but the growing 
concern  about  domestic  radicalization 
suggests this proverb needs to be 
retired.32
4. Risk might be a  function  of threat, 
vulnerability,  and consequence, but in 
homeland security  the nature of,  and data 
sources for, that  function  remain 
illusive. 33
5. All  disasters may  once have been  local, 
but in  homeland security’s second decade, 
one may  need to acknowledge “disasters 
h a v e f a r - r e a c h i n g  c o n s e q u e n c e s 
throughout regions,  states, the nation  and 
even the globe.” 34
6. All  hazards does not  really  mean all 
hazards.  As one of the nation’s respected 
emergency  management  scholars 
explained, “All-hazards  does not literally 
mean  being  prepared for  any  and all 
hazards that might manifest  themselves 
in a  particular  community, state, or 
nation.”  It  does mean  developing  a 
general  plan  that  “can provide the basis 
for  responding  to unexpected events.” 35 
[My emphasis.]
7. Getting  a kit, making a  plan  and staying 
informed may  be one theory  about 
preparedness, but  the advice does not 
appear  to resonate with  the American 
p e o p l e .  O n e s t a t e e m e r g e n c y 
management director suggested, 
We need to reframe expectations. A 
disaster  kit, prepackaged and stored 
away only  to be used in a disaster is not 
practical  for many  Americans. It is 
costly  and takes time, attention, and 
desire to maintain…. We must educate 
the public about the risks they  actually 
face, have an  honest discussion with 
t h e m  a b o u t w h a t t h e y e x p e c t 
government to do, what they  can do 
and, more to the point, what they must 
do. Then  we need to ask how we can 
help them  be better prepared. But not 
through  another  revised seventy-two-
hour preparedness campaign  with  the 
same messages we are promoting 
today.36
8. If you  see something,  say  something, but 
what  gets said, and with  what effect? The 
Metropolitan  Transit  Authority  created 
the trademarked slogan  shortly  after  the 
9/11/01  attacks. It  has since been  leased 
to the Department  of Homeland Security. 
Is this proverb an  effective way  to engage 
citizens in  homeland security,  is it 
eyewash, or  is it  pernicious?37  One 
security  expert  cautioned,  "if you  ask 
amateurs to act  as front-line security 
personnel, you  shouldn't  be surprised 
when  you  get amateur security. People 
don't  need to be reminded to call the 
police; the slogan is nothing  more than  an 
invitation to report  people who are 
different.” 38 
9. The idea  that people are likely  to panic in 
a  disaster  persists in  the face of 
convincing evidence to the contrary.  As 
one example,  a  study  of over  500 disaster 
events concluded: “panic was of very  little 
practical or operational importance.” 39
10. People  who agree with  Benjamin 
Franklin’s 1775  homily  that  “Those who 
would give  up essential liberty  to 
purchase a  little temporary  security 
deserve neither  liberty  nor security,”  may 
ignore the suggestion  raised by  Philip 
Bobbitt that in The Wars  for the Twenty-
First Century  “it  is possible  to increase 
the powers of government  and, at the 
same time,  increase the rights of the 
people.” 40
11. The belief “Terrorists only  have to be 
lucky  once; we have to be lucky  all the 
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time”  originated in  a  terrorist message 
issued after  the 1984  Brighton bombing.41 
US policymakers adapted the language 
and turned it into a  strategic  proverb.42 
One American  WMD expert countered 
that  claim  by  noting terrorists planning  a 
complex operation  have to worry  about 
many  pieces coming  together.  “They  have 
to be right  all the time,”  he said.  “We only 
have to be right once to stop them.”43
WHAT IS YOUR CLAIM AND WHY 
SHOULD ANYONE BELIEVE IT?
The proverbs discussed in this essay  may  turn 
out eventually  to be approximately  right  or 
substantially  wrong. As Herbert  Simon  wrote 
about a different set of proverbs: 
It is not that the propositions expressed by 
the proverbs are insufficient; it  is rather 
that they  prove too much…. For almost 
every  principle one can  find an equally 
plausible and contradictory  principle…and 
there is  nothing…to indicate which  is the 
proper one to apply.44
A  2011  study  described homeland security 
as an  “anemic  policy  regime,”  whose 
purposes are “poorly  understood and not 
widely  shared among  different elements of 
the federal  government  or  at  subnational 
levels.”  It  is characterized by  “the weakness of 
the integrative ideas of ‘homeland security’ 
and ‘all  hazards’ preparedness,  the lack  of a 
strong constituency  for  the regime,  and the 
institutional  misalignment  among  relevant 
subsystems.” 45
That critique does not flatter the 
organizations and people who shaped the 
homeland security  enterprise. But  the study’s 
conclusions are based on evidence not 
slogans. One can  agree or  disagree with  the 
authors ’ assumptions, analysis ,  and 
conclusions, but  one does not have to guess 
how those conclusions were derived.
Homeland security’s second decade ought 
to evolve toward a narrative foundation 
constructed by  something  more substantial 
than  proof by  repeated assertion.  One should 
ask for evidence.
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6 See http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing5/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-11-19.htm;  National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2004), 398; United States, National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, 2002) 33. Homeland Security 
Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007), 4.
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7 For examples see Christopher Bellavita, “85% of what you know about homeland security is probably wrong,” 
Homeland Security Watch (blog), March 16, 2009, http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/03/16/85-percent-is-wrong/, especially 
the insightful comments.  The most recent instance I’ve seen of the number in print is testimony at the House 
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security 
Technologies, March 16, 2011 by James A. Lewis, “Examining the Cyber Threat to Critical Infrastructure and the 
American Economy,” 4.  On August 15, 2011, while this paper was being prepared, I heard the number used during a 
conference of homeland security professionals: “As every one knows,” the speaker said, “85 percent of our critical 
infrastructure is directed by the private sector.”
8 For Canada, see http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/unprepared-canada-lacks-plan-protect-critical-infrastructure. 
For the Czech Republic, see http://bit.ly/ofI5wv.pdf.
9 For example, see Paul C. Robinson, Joan B Woodard, and Samuel G. Varnado, “Critical Infrastructure: Interlinked 
and Vulnerable,” Issues in Science and Technology,  Fall (1998), www.issues.org/15.1/Robins.htm.2. This article is one of  
the earliest written examples I’ve found of the 85 percent number.
10 For example, see “What is CIP?” http://cip.gmu.edu/component/k2/item/118-what-is-cip?     
11 As noted in Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (February 2005), 
3: “USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e), defining critical infrastructure. This definition is incorporated by  
reference into the Homeland Security Act of 2002, see 6 U.S.C. § 101.”
12 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2009), 109.
13 Robert Stephan, “Database is Just the 1st Step,” USA Today, July 21, 2006, 8A.
14 Charlie Jasonberg pointed out (http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/03/16/85-percent-is-wrong/#comment-134580): “One of 
the GMU CIP reports investigated the 85% claim for the water sector. It used EPA and other data, and learned that 
61% of the water sector was owned by the private sector, with 28% owned by local governments. So, the [percent] will 
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